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Abstract
We study rmspreferences towards intellectual property rights (IPR)
regimes in a North-South context, using a simple duopoly model where
a North and a South rm compete in a third market. Unlike other
contributions in this eld, we explicitly introduce the Souths capability
to undertake cost-reducing R&D, but maintain the Souths inferiority in
utilizing and managing its R&D. In contrast to traditional results, we
show that the North may encourage lax IPR protection provided that its
South rivals R&D productivity is su¢ ciently high, while the South may
nd it in its best interest to strictly enforce IPR protection if its R&D
productivity is low. In this sense, our results do not support the idea
of universal or uniform IPR protection regime. In addition, we nd that
if rms are allowed to agree on any level of information exchange when
IPR protection is strictly enforced, such an exchange can always be estab-
lished as long as each rm is ensured that what it gets to utilize in return
is greater than a half of what it gives to its rival.
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1 Introduction
The Asian Tigers, namely South Korea and Taiwan, are examples of countries
that emerged as aggressive competitors in consumer electronics, microelectron-
ics, robotics, computers and peripherals, as well as in various services during
the 1980s. The erosion of the technological leadership of rms in industrialized
countries, notably the United States, in these hi-tech areas has been partially at-
tributed to the too open technological and scientic system which allowed foreign
countries to imitate and prot from US innovations (Correa (1994)). This was
one of the reasons for the US to aggressively push for a reform in the Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR) regimes. Henceforth, the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereafter the TRIPS agreement) was
established with the clear objective of universally harmonizing standards of IPR
protection. Developing countries reluctantly negotiated increased standards of
protection, even though they regarded the TRIPS agreement as a policy of
"technological protectionism" whereby the developed countries generate inno-
vations and the developing countries provide markets for the resulting products
or services(Correa (2000)).
The TRIPS issue was very critical between the Northern and the Southern
countries during the Uruguay round, leading to a North-South confrontation,
where the North traditionally refers to countries where inventions or innovations
take place, and the South comprises developing countries or countries that are to
a large extent dependent upon the innovations made in the North. Innovations
by the North can be copied at very low cost by the South without consent from
the innovators, so that the strengthening of IPR protection inevitably stirred
the conict of interest between the North and the South.
However, the increasing capacity to innovate in the R&D intensive indus-
tries of countries such as South Korea and Taiwan has challenged traditional
views. Although these developing countries have followed and relied extensively
on the adaptation and improvement of imported technologies in their path of
industrialization, some of them have now reached technological levels that could
be further enhanced by their own R&D e¤orts. Some developed minor product
and process innovations to be used in their domestic industries(Correa (2000)).
For example, South Korea has emerged as a world class competitor in the semi-
conductor industry while Taiwan has also developed signicant capacity in this
eld. The technological advances in this industry evolve as an interactive, cu-
mulative process where improvement is directly based on the pre-existing stock
of knowledge, hence access to the most up-to-date information which may be
possessed by the rival rms is very benecial. Similarly, innovation in software
development is typically incremental. It is a process that builds on and interacts
with many other features of existing technology to create a new technology. In
the case of multimedia products, the re-use of existing copyrighted materials
from numerous rights-holders may pose a great burden and entail high transac-
tion costs. Hence for these types of industries strict enforcement of IPR through
various types of legal instruments may negatively a¤ect the di¤usion of com-
puter programs, the invention of integrated circuits, and related product and
process innovations.
To the best of our knowledge, most economic analysis on the impact of the
TRIPS agreement on developing countries has not yet reected their signicant
technological development (e.g., Chin and Grossman (1990), Diwan and Rodrik
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(1991), Deardor¤ (1992) and µZigi´c (1997)). It is generally assumed that innov-
ative activities are solely performed in the North. A South rm does no R&D
and just imitates technology produced in the North via spillovers. Chin and
Grossman (1990) are the rst to formally model the conict of interest regard-
ing the degree of IPR protection between the North and the South. They show
that the South always prefers no IPR protection unless its share of comsumption
is so high that the Southern consumers gain signicantly from the fruits of the
North rmsR&D e¤ort. However, from the Norths point of view, it is always
benecial having its IPR protected by the South regardless of market struc-
ture. Hence, there generally exists a conict of interest between the North and
South. µZigi´c (1998) complements Chin and Grossman (1990) by endogenizing
the strength of IPR protection, reected in the intensity of spillovers, and nds
that the nal market structure not only depends on R&D e¢ ciency but also
on the strength of IPR protection. Diwan and Rodrik (1991) allow for di¤erent
preferences for technology or products between the North and the South such
that markets are segmented as well as for a gradation of IPR protection. Their
basic idea is that R&D resources in the North are limited, so choices have to
be made as to which area of technology would receive greater emphasis. They
nd that an increase in the IPR protection in either of the two regions increases
the Norths innovative activities, and IPR protection in one region can skew
the technology range away from the needs of the other region. So when the
di¤erence in preference is substantial, the South may benet by strengthening
its IPR protection so that it can inuence the choice of technology or product
developed by the North.
Lai and Qiu (2003) are among the rst to assume that both the North and the
South have innovative capability in conducting product innovation.1 To address
the issue of multi-sectoral (multi-issue) negotiations in the GATT/WTO context
through a bargaining game, they assume two types of goods produced in each
region, the di¤erentiated and traditional products. Innovation and imitation
are carried out only in the di¤erentiated product sector, thus IPR protection is
an issue in this sector. On the other hand, tari¤ reduction granted by the North
to the imported traditional good produced by the South is used as an incentive
for the South to protect the Norths IPR. They show that without appropriate
tari¤ concession given by the North, the South would nd strengthening its
IPR protection makes it worse o¤, and has no incentive to harmonize its IPR
protection with the Norths.
In contrast to the papers mentioned above, we allow for process innovation
in the South and for the rms to benet from each others innovation under lax
IPR protection, when spillovers abound. In this aspect, our basic setup falls
into the typical  R&D with spilloversmodels.2 When IPR protection is lax
spillovers are high and refer to leakages in technological know-how so that each
rms nal cost reduction is the sum of its autonomously acquired part and a
fraction of the other rmspart where such fraction indicates the intensity of
1Grossman and Lai (2004) also study the incentives that governments have in choosing
the level of optimal patent length in a North-South context. In an open economy setting,
they assume that although both countries have innovating rms, the North has a greater
innovative capacity. They show that with national treatment of IPR protection being applied,
the di¤erences in market size and di¤erences in capacity for R&D cause di¤erences in countrys
optimal patent policy.
2See e.g., Spence (1984), dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al (1992), and
De Bondt et al.(1992).
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the R&D spillovers.
One important feature we introduce is the asymmetry in R&D productivity
between the North and the South rm. With a long experience in R&D
activity, the North is naturally perceived as being more R&D productive than
the South. Firms possess di¤erent levels of ability to absorb and utilize R&D
output, as well as di¤erent levels of cost e¢ ciency. Factors governing these
di¤erences range from di¤erent organizational and managerial structures to the
individual talent of engineers and R&D experts. One form of R&D management
may allow or force R&D personnel to extract benets or utilize the fruits of
R&D activities more productively than others. In a theoretical sense, these
di¤erences can be portrayed by di¤erent levels of pre-innovation marginal cost,
R&D productivity, or R&D cost e¢ ciency.3 We dene our R&D productivity
parameter in the same way as Barros and Nilssen (1999), that is: the rate
at which R&D activities transform into cost reduction. Our present model
concentrates on the asymmetry of R&D productivity.4
We aim to examine the importance of the asymmetry in R&D productivity
and how this a¤ects rmsperceptions toward the strength of IPR protection.
We look at a possible conict of interest between the North and the South
regarding the appropriate IPR protection regime and explore under what cir-
cumstances such a conict could be avoided. In doing so, we propose a model
embodying both asymmetry in rmsR&D productivity and spillovers and con-
sider how di¤erent degrees of IPR protection regimes a¤ect the North and the
South rmschoices of R&D as well as their prots.
We show that in spite of being a superior innovator, the North does not
always benet from having its IPR respected; this depends on the level of the
South rms R&D productivity. If the Souths productivity is high enough both
rms benet from high spillovers and hence would prefer a lax IPR regime.
Moreover, when the South rm realizes that its R&D productivity is much
inferior compared to the North rm, the South rm prefers strict IPR protection.
In addition, if rms are allowed to engage in information exchange when IPRs
are fully protected, such info-sharing agreement can always be established as
long as each rm knows that what it can get and utilize is su¢ ciently more
than what it gives to its rival.
In the following section, we present the basic model and calculate the equilib-
rium under two IPR protection regimes: lax and strict; we then compare R&D,
output and prot across regimes. In section 3 we discuss the case where the
rms are allowed to use side payments to press for a particular type of IPR pro-
tection. In section 4, we extend the model to allow rms to decide whether they
would want to engage in information exchange when governments enforce IPR
protection strictly. Finally, in section 5 we provide some concluding remarks.
3R&D productivity refers to ability to bring down the marginal cost of production, while
R&D cost e¢ ciency concentrates on the cost of conducting R&D.
4Poyago-Theotoky (1996) considers the rms incentive to invest in the situation where
spillovers are absent and the competing rms start o¤ with di¤erent pre-innovation marginal
costs.
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2 The Model
Two rms, designated North,(n); and South,(s), engage in cost-reducing R&D
and export all their (homogenous) product to a third market with linear inverse
demand P = A   P
i=n;s
qi, where P; A and qi denotes price, size of the market
and rm i s quantity respectively. For simplicity, we normalize the size of the
market to 1.
In the absence of R&D, both s and n produce with the same production
marginal cost, c (< 1): The post-innovation production marginal costs of the
North rm and the South rm are denoted by cn and cs respectively. The two-
way5 spillover parameter, , portrays involuntary ows of R&D output between
the North and the South rms. The extent of spillovers can take two values:no
spilloversor complete spillovers,  2 f0; 1g: This spillover parameter,  can
also be interpreted as reecting the strength of the IPR protection, implying
no protection ( = 1) or full IPR protection ( = 0) and this is the interpre-
tation we shall follow here. Let xn and xs denote the North and South rms
autonomous R&D output respectively.
A rms R&D productivity is denoted by i, and i 2 (0; 1): The two rms
are asymmetric in the sense that rm s has a lower R&D productivity than rm
n: given the same e¤ective R&D output6 , s achieves less cost reduction than
n, or, equivalently, rm n is more productive than rm s in utilizing its R&D
to bring down the unit cost of production, i.e., n > s. This allows to take
into account a certain degree of advantage n may have over s as, for example, a
result of cumulative experience in conducting R&D. Without loss of generality,
we normalize rm ns R&D productivity to one, i.e. n = 1; and set s = 
with  < 1:
Unit costs of production are therefore cn = c (xn+xs) and cs = c (xs+
xn). The R&D cost function takes the form: Ri =
ix
2
i
2 where Ri denotes rm
is R&D expenditure (i = n; s), and i(> 0) captures R&D e¢ ciency, which
indicates how costly R&D is. When i takes a high value, it means that a unit
of R&D output can be achieved at high cost, thus the task of reducing unit cost
is relatively di¢ cult. The R&D cost function exhibits diminishing returns to
R&D. For simplicity, we assume that n = s = : That is, to obtain a unit of
R&D output, the rms spend equal sums of money.
We then consider a two-stage game where rms simultaneously and inde-
pendently make decisions on R&D in the rst stage, taking each othersR&D
decisions as given. They then compete in quantity in the second stage, given
the level of R&D expenditure from the rst stage of the game.
Our aim is to explore how di¤erent IPR protection regimes a¤ect the North
and the South rmsR&D incentives, quantities and prots; in particular, we
study no IPR protection vis-à-vis complete IPR protection . We thus divide our
analysis into two cases: (i) no IPR protection (full spillovers,  = 1) and (ii)
complete IPR protection (no spillovers,  = 0) .
5FirmsR&D outputs are complementary so that a rms R&D knowledge can be useful
to its rival as much as to itself.
6The term  e¤ective R&D output  is dened by Kamien et al. (1992) as the sum of
a rms own R&D output and what it can extract from the other rmsR&D outputs via
spillovers.
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2.1 No IPR Protection (NP or Full Spillovers,  = 1)
In this case, a rm can exploit the R&D output of the other rm as much as its
own. The post-innovation unit cost of rm n is cn = c  (xn + xs), and of rm
s is cs = c  (xn + xs) and, obviously cs > cn:
In the second stage, each rm chooses its output to maximize prots, yielding
two possible outcomes: an interior solution with
qNPi =
1  2ci + cj 6=i
3
; i = n; s (1)
requiring cs < cn+12 ; and a corner solution, where q
NP
s = 0; q
NP
n =
1 cn
2 ,
occuring when cs  cn+12 :The cost combinations that generate the interior and
corner solutions are shown in gure 1.
Figure 1
As we study how R&D decisions are a¤ected by the IPR regime, we restrict
the analysis to the case where both rms engage in R&D:  > 12 is su¢ cient for
such an interior solution7 .
Assumption 1 (IS): For both rms to be active productivity is  2   12 ; 1 :
Substituting for cn and cs, (1) can be written as qNPn =
K+(2 )(xn+xs)
3
and qNPs =
K+(2 1)(xn+xs)
3 ; where K  1   c > 0 measures the "e¤ective"
market size; the associated equilibrium prots are NPn = (q
NP
n )
2 and NPs =
(qNPs )
2. Observe that as a result of the complete spillovers between the North
and the South, R&D benets each other in terms of increasing quantity supplied
(@q
NP
n
@xs
= 2 3 > 0; and
@qNPs
@xn
= (2 1)3 > 0 (from Assumption IS )): ns R&D
output helps reduce ss unit cost, leading to ns output expansion and vice versa.
In the rst stage of the game, each rm chooses R&D output to maximize sec-
ond stage prot net of R&D expenditure, i.e. NPn =

K+(2 )(xn+xs)
3
2
  x2n2 ;
7The requirement cs < 1+cn2 can be written as c (xs+xn) <
c (xn+xs)+1
2
: By algebraic
manipulation, it is easy to see that a su¢ cient condition for an interior solution (xs > 0; and
xn > 0) is  >
1
2
.
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Table 1: Summary of the SPNE investments, outputs, prots and their com-
parative statics under weak IPRs protection regimes.
Variable Equilibrium Value sign @@ Comparison Result
xNPn
2K(2 )(9+6(2 1)(1 ))

f
  xNPn > xNPs
xNPs
2K(2 1)(9 6(2 )(1 ))

f
+
qNPn
9K(3+2(2 1)(1 ))

f
  qNPn > qNPs
qNPs
9K(3 2(2 )(1 ))

f
+
NPn
9K2(3+2(2 1)(1 ))2(9 2(2 )2)

2f
+ NPn > 
NP
s
NPs
9K2(3 2(2 )(1 ))2(9 2(2 1)2)

2f
+
and NPs =

K+(2 1)(xn+xs)
3
2
  x2s2 : The corresponding rst-order conditions
give the rmsbest response functions:
xn =
2(2  )(K + (2  )xs)
9   2(2  )2 ; (2)
xs =
2(2   1)(K + (2   1)xn)
9   2(2   1)2 : (3)
The rmsR&D, xn and xs; are strategic complements8 . Under complete
spillovers, ns R&D output helps reduce the unit cost of s, thus enhances the
marginal protability of ss R&D investment. A similar rationale applies to rm
s. From (2) and (3), solving for the equilibrium R&D outputs, xNPn and x
NP
s ;
we obtain
xNPn =
2K(2  )(9 + 6(2   1)(1  ))

f
(4)
xNPs =
2K(2   1)(9   6(2  )(1  ))

f
; (5)
where 
f  [9   2(2  )2][9   2(2  1)2]  4(2  )2(2  1)2 > 0 (from the
relevant stability condition). Note that the additional assumption that  > 1
is needed for the second-order conditions, the stability conditions and interior
solutions to hold in the R&D subgame.9 The corresponding equilibrium values
are summarized in Table 1, together with their comparative statics results.
The results in Table 1 show that the more R&D productive rm obtains a
higher cost reduction (invests more in R&D), has a larger market share and
prots more, as suggested by intuition. Interestingly, an increase in the pro-
ductivity of the Southern rm is benecial not only to itself but also to the rival
North rm (@
NP
n
@ > 0) despite having a negative impact on the latters R&D
and market share.
8 dxn
dxs
=
2(2 )2
9 2(2 )2 > 0 and
dxs
dxn
=
2(2 1)2
9 2(2 1)2 > 0:
9Derivation of these conditions and proofs of comparative static results are available from
the authors upon request.
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A rise in the South rm, s, R&D productivity increases its protability
and thus its incentive to invest. Even though both rmsR&D are strategic
complements, higher R&D by s will adversely a¤ect the North rms, n, R&D.
To understand this better, we disentangle the e¤ects of R&D investment on ns
prot. From the rst stage prot function NPn = f(q
NP
n ; q
NP
s ; xn), where q
NP
n
and qNPs are the optimal quantities determined from the second stage:
@NPn
@xn
=
@NPn
@qn
@qNPn
@xn| {z }
0 from FOC in 2nd stage
+
@NPn
@qs
@qNPs
@xn| {z }
strategic motive
+
@NPn
@xn| {z }
prot motive
(6)
= 0 +   qNPn
@qNPs
@xn
+
@NPn
@xn
:(7)
We are interested in the strategic motive as it captures a rms intention to
manipulate its rivals R&D decision. Recall that @q
NP
s
@xn
> 0; so that the strategic
motive is negative: n has an incentive to underinvest in R&D compared to the
e¢ cient level.10 This is because, ns own R&D helps enhance the ss quantity,
which in turn reduces ns prot. Once ss R&D productivity increases, rm s
invests more, thus supplying a higher quantity to the output market. Firm n
foresees that its own R&D will just strengthen ss position in the output market,
it thus lowers its R&D. However, the increase in ss R&D in response to the
rise in its R&D productivity is not large enough to compensate for the fall in ns
investment and consequently ns quantity falls. The interesting result is that ns
prot actually increases with ss R&D productivity. This is mainly due to the
savings n makes on its R&D expenditure: it freerides on ss R&D and decreases
its own.
2.2 Full IPR Protection (FP or No Spillovers  = 0)
When IPR protection is complete there are e¤ectively no spillovers so a rms
e¤ective R&D is its own autonomous R&D output. Unit costs of the two rms
are cn = c xn and cs = c xs: Equilibrium output in the second stage for each
rm is still represented by (1). Substituting for cn and cs; (1) can be written
as qFPn =
K+2xn xs
3 and q
FP
s =
K+2xs xn
3 : The associated equilibrium prot
is FPi = (q
FP
i )
2; i = n; s. Observe that dq
FP
n
dxs
=   3 ; and dq
FP
s
dxn
=   13 ; thus the
e¤ect of xs on qFPn depends on ss R&D productivity.
In the rst stage of the game, each rm maximizes its own prot net R&D
cost, taking R&D of the other rm as given. Thus the prot functions of the
two rms are FPn =
 
K+2xn xs
3
2    x2n2 ; FPs =  K+2xs xn3 2    x2s2 :
The rst-order conditions give the best response functions
xn =
4K   4xs
9   8 ; (8)
xs =
4K   4xn
9   82 : (9)
10The e¢ cient level is determined by @
NP
n
@xn
=
@NPn
@qn
dqNPn
dxn
+
@NPn
@xn
= 0;at this level of
R&D, its marginal benet is equated to its marginal cost. In this case, the e¢ cient level is
where qNPn   xn = 0:
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Table 2: Summary of the SPNE investments, outputs, prots and their com-
parative statics under complete IPRs protection regimes.
Symbol Values Sign @@ Comparison Result
xFPn
4K(9 122)

n
> 0 - xFPn >x
FP
s
xFPs
4K(9 12)

n
> 0 +
qFPn
9K(3 42)

n
> 0 - qFPn >q
FP
s
qFPs
9K(3 4)

n
> 0 +
FPn
9K2(3 42)2(9 8)

2n
> 0 - FPn >
FP
s
FPs
9K2(3 4)2(9 8)

2n
> 0 +
The two rmsR&D are strategic substitutes11 . Under full IPR protection,
R&D for the two rms is a strategic substitute. An expansion in the Norths out-
put supplied induced by its own R&D investment adversely a¤ects the Souths
prot. That means an increase in ns R&D reduces the marginal protablity of
a unit of R&D output achieved by s. Consequently s cuts down its own R&D.
From (8) and (9) solving for equilibrium R&D we obtain
xFPn =
4K(9   122)

n
; (10)
xFPs =
4K(9   12)

n
; (11)
where 
n  (9   8)(9   82)   162 > 0 from the relevant stability con-
dition. For the second-order condition, stability condition and positive R&D
investments to hold in this R&D subgame, we need  > 129 :
12
The corresponding equilibrium values and how they respond to the change
in ss R&D productivity are summarized in Table 2.
Similar to the previous case of no IPR protection, the more R&D productive
rm attains higher R&D marginal protability, thus has higher incentive to
invest, which consequently leads to a larger reduction in production cost, more
quantity supplied to the market, and higher prot made.
Higher R&D by the s due to the increased R&D productivity adversely
a¤ects ns R&D, quantity and prot. To see the rationale behind, we again
disentangle the e¤ects of R&D investment on ns prot. From the rst stage
prot function: FPn = P (bqn; qFPs )bqn   (c   xn)bqn   x2n2 ; where qFPn and qFPs
are the optimal quantities determined from the second stage, we disentangle the
e¤ect of xn on FPn
d FPn
dxn
=
@ FPn
@qn
dbqn
dxn| {z }
0 from FOC in 2nd stage
+
@ FPn
@qs
d qFPs
dxn| {z }
strategic motive
+
@ FPn
@xn| {z }
prot motive
(12)
= 0 +   bqn dbqs
dxn
+
@ FPn
@xn
:(13)
11 dxn
dxs
=  4
9 8 < 0 and
dxs
dxn
=  4
9 82 < 0:
12Derivation of these condition and proofs of comparative statics results are available from
the authors upon request.
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Recall that @ q
FP
s
@xn
< 0 when spillovers are absent. The strategic motive is
positive which means n has an incentive to overinvest in R&D compared to the
e¢ cient level.13 ns R&D negatively a¤ects ss quantity, which consequently
increases ns prot. Thus, n has incentive to overinvest. An increase in ss
R&D productivity induces higher investment and larger quantity supplied by
s in the output market. n knows that its own R&D will not be as e¤ective in
reducing ss quantity in the output market. Thus, its incentive to overinvest
declines. Since n cannot benet from any increase in R&D conducted by s
under strict IPR protection, its quantity supplied falls as a result of lower R&D.
Consequently, ns prot falls.
2.3 Comparison of IPR Regimes
In this section we compare IPR regimes. From the analysis above we have
established that the North rm, n ; does more R&D, produces more output and
prots more than the South rm, s, irrespective of the IPR regime, due to the
R&D productivity di¤erence.
E¤ective R&D under no IPR protection, i.e. xNPn + x
NP
s ; is
18K(1+)

f
: It is
straightforward to show14 that within the admissible values for the productivity
parameter (i.e., 2 (1=2; 1]) and as long as  > 1:5 e¤ective R&D is increasing in
R&D productivity, i.e., d(x
NP
n +x
NP
s )
d > 0:In what follows, this latter restriction
on  is imposed. Comparing xNPn + x
NP
s with x
FP
n and x
FP
s ; we nd that
xFPn > x
NP
n + x
NP
s for  2 (1=2; 1) and xFPn = xNPn + xNPs for  = 1: So
unless R&D productivity is the same for both rms, the e¤ective R&D of n
is higher under full IPR protection compared to that under no IPR protection.
Next, comparing xNPn +x
NP
s and x
FP
s ; we nd that unless  = 1; ss R&D under
complete IPR protection is less than e¤ective R&D under no IPR protection (i.e.,
xFPs < x
NP
n + x
NP
s ). At  = 1; we have x
NP
n + x
NP
s = x
FP
s : So to summarise,
ss autonomous R&D under full IPR protection is less than its e¤ective R&D
under no IPR protection except when  = 1; where e¤ective R&D levels under
the two contrasting IPR regimes are equal.
Regarding prots the following proposition summarises (its proof is in the
Appendix).
Proposition 1 (i) The South rm always prots more under no IPR protection
than under full IPR protection, NPs > 
FP
s :
(ii)As per the North rm, there exists a critical value e such that NPn > FPn
for  > e; and NPn  FPn otherwise.
Interestingly, there are cases where n prefers no IPR protection: this is
so when ss R&D productivity is high enough ( > e). In these instances n
prots more from no IPR protection compared to the full IPR protection regime.
The range where this is the case increases as R&D becomes more di¢ cult, i.e.,
13The e¢ cient level is determined by @bn
@qn
dbqn
dxn
+ @bn
@xn
: At this level of R&D, its marginal
benet is equated to its marginal cost.
14Proofs of d(x
NP
n +x
NP
s )
d
> 0 , the comparison between xNPn + x
NP
s and x
FP
n , x
FP
s and
further comparisons are available from the authors upon request.
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the critical value e decreases in , the di¢ culty/costliness of R&D. This is
illustrated in Figure 2 and Table 3. 15 16
Figure 2
n
FP
n
N P
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.14
0.16
0.18
2
n
FP
n
FP
n
N P
0 .6 0 .7 0 .8 0 .9 1 .0
0 .114
0 .116
0 .118
10
Table 3 - Critical value e
 1.5 1.78 2 5 10 20 25e 0.89 0.80 0.77 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.61
Regarding the North rms interest in IPR protection, our model produces
results di¤erent from Chin and Grossman (1990). In their model of a single
innovator, in which only one rm in the North performs R&D activities, the
North rm always prefers high IPR protection as its prot is higher when the
South rm cannot benet from any copying. In contrast, in our model, the
North rm has an opportunity to make use of the South rms technology for
its own benet. In particular, if the South rm is relatively productive in R&D,
its incentive perform R&D is of benet to the North rm despite IPR not being
fully protected. In summary, although the South rm always prefers no IPR to
complete IPR as expected, there are cases where the North rm has the same
preference as the South rm for the IPR regime so that the traditional conict
about IPR regimes does not hold. This novel results depends on the magnitude
of the South rms R&D productivity, the higher the R&D productivity the less
the conict about the extent of IPR protection.
3 Lobbying for IPR protection
When there is conict in the preference towards IPR regime by the rival rms an
interesting question to ask is whether if the rms were given the option of side
payments between them, would it be in their interest to lobby for a particular
type of IPR protection. In such a case, side payments may be used to alleviate
the rmsconict of interest.
From proposition 1 we know that NPn > 
FP
n for 1 > e >  and NPn  FPn
for 12 <  <
e; whereas NPs > FPs for all 12 <  < 1: The conict of interest
arises when 12 <  <
e: In this range of , if the North rm nds FPn   NPn
> NPs  FPs (or, FPn +FPs > NPn +NPs ) it may pay NPs  FPs to the South
15Since the expression for e() is quite cumbersome we calculate the value of e() for xed
K, as this is just a scaling parameter. In Table 3, we have xed K = 1.
16 In Figure 2, we choose  = 2 and  = 10 as examples. These values of  are su¢ cient for
the stability condition to hold in both regimes and K is xed at 1.
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rm on the condition that the South rm lobbies its government to adopt the
strict IPR regime. Similarly, if the South rm nds NPs   FPs > FPn   NPn
or (FPn + 
FP
s < 
NP
n + 
NP
s ) it can pay the North rm 
FP
n   NPn and ask
the North to lobby its government to go for lax IPR protection.
We then search for a range of  that gives either FPn   NPn > NPs   FPs
or NPs   FPs > FPn   NPn . From the equilibrium expressions for prot we
calculate industry prot under the two regimes:
NP = NPn +
NP
s =
18K2(81
3 92(23 + (23   44))+
162(1  )4 8(1  2)2(2  )2(1  )2)

2f
FP = FPn +
FP
s =
18K2(81
3 1442(1 + 2) + 24(3 + 82+34)  642(1 + )2)

2n
:
Due to the complexity of the above expressions, we resorted to numerical
simulations. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the South rmss R&D
productivity, R&D e¤ectiveness and industry prots under no IPR protection
and full protection, NP and FP . In the Figure, shown for K = 10 (this is a
scaling parameter that does not a¤ect the shapes of the prot surfaces), NP
is shown in red (top surface) and FP is shown in blue (bottom surface).
0.6
0.8
1.0
2
4
6
8
10
20
25
30
35
Figure 3
It is clear that NP >FP ; or NPn + 
NP
s > 
FP
n + 
FP
s ; is always the
case for 12 <  < 1. Industry prot under no IPR protection is larger than
that under strict IPR protection. Therefore the North rm will nd the o¤er
from the South rm in exchange for the adoption of no IPR protection regime
benecial. We then conclude that if 12 <  <
e , the conict of interest between
the North and the South rms can be alleviated using a side payment scheme.
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4 Voluntary Information Exchange
In this section we conne our analysis within the strict IPR protection regime
(e.g., enforced by the governments of both countries) and investigate whether
the rms would nd it in their interest to voluntarily engage in information ex-
change. From section 2, we know that the South rm would always prefer a lax
IPR regime while the North rm would only do so for relatively high R&D pro-
ductivity of the South rm. When the strict IPR regime is enforced, engaging
in information exchange might serve as a way-round the IPR regime. Thus we
extend the basic model to a three-stage game: in the rst stage rms make de-
cisions simultaneously and noncooperatively on their R&D; in the second-stage
they decide whether to share or not their rst-stage discoveries (information
exchange stage) and then compete in the product market in the third stage.
Only when both rms agree to share information does exchange of information
occur (Kultti and Takalo (1998)).
We start by having xvn and x
v
s denote the levels of (sunk) R&D made in the
rst stage while n and s are the degrees of information exchange realized by
n and s respectively. We allow for di¤erences in R&D productivity of the two
rms; n and s are the R&D productivity parameters respectively and n > s .
In the second stage, exchange of information happens only when such exchange
benets both rms in terms of higher prots. Thus in deciding, rms compare
prots obtained under no agreement with those when there is agreement.
Solving for rms n prot under a given degree of information sharing we
nd
IEn =

1  c+ (2n   ss)xvn + (2nn   s)xvs
3
2
  (x
v
n)
2
2
: (14)
In the case of no information exchange
NIEn =

1  c+ 2nxvn   sxvs
3
2
  (x
v
n)
2
2
: (15)
Obviously, IEn > 
NIE
n if and only if nnx
v
s >
ssx
v
n
2 : This means that
n welcomes the agreement only if the "net" benets (i.e., adjusted for produc-
tivity di¤erences) from R&D spillovers from s is larger than one half of what n
contributes the ss cost reduction.
Similarly for rm s we obtain,
IEs =

1  c+ (2ss   n)xvn + (2s   nn)xvs
3
2
  (x
v
s)
2
2
; (16)
and
NIEs =

1  c  nxvn + 2sxvs
3
2
  (x
v
s)
2
2
: (17)
Clearly IEs > 
NIE
s if and only if ssx
v
n >
nnx
v
s
2 with a similar interpre-
tation as for n above.
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For simplicity, suppose that s = n = : The rms mutually agree on a
particular level of sharing, which implies that the exchange of information will
occur only when nx
v
s
2 < sx
v
n < 2nx
v
s or
1
2 <
sx
v
n
nxvs
< 2. In deciding whether
to share information or not in the second stage, a rm takes into account the
levels of sunk R&D of its counterpart and its R&D productivity. The relative
benet of the agreement accrued to n and s, sx
v
n
nxvs
must be in the range ( 12 ; 2):
17
In the rst stage, the rms independently and simultaneously make decisions
on R&D taking into account the possibility of an information exchange agree-
ment in the second stage: Di¤erentiating (14) and (16) with respect to xvn and x
v
s
respectively, we obtain the rmsbest responses: xvn =
2(2n s)(K+(2nn s)xvs )
9 2(2n ss)2
and xvs =
2(2s n)(K+(2s n)xvn)
9 2(2s n)2 : Solving
18 for the SPE we obtain
xvn =
2(2n   s)K[9   6(2s   n)(s   n)]

(18)
xvs =
2(2s   n)K[9   6(2n   s)(n   s)]

; (19)
where  = [9   2(2s   n)2][9   2(2n   s)2]   4(2s   n)(2n  
s)(2s   n)(2n   s) > 0: An interior solution is guaranteed when i >
i
2 ; i = n; s.
Since the condition nx
v
s
2 < sx
v
n < 2nx
v
s must hold for voluntary exchange
of information, we examine whether 2nxvs   sxvn > 0 and sxvn   nx
v
s
2 > 0
hold. From (18)
2nx
v
s   sxvn =
2K[9(2ns   22n + 2s) 
6(2s   n)(2n   s)(22n   ns   2s)]

; (20a)
sx
v
n  
nx
v
s
2
=
K[9(2ns   22s + 2n) 
6(2s   n)(2n   s)(22s   ns   2n)]

: (20b)
Due to the complexity of the above two expressions, we use numerical sim-
ulations to facilitate the comparison. We x n at 1, and rst set  at the
minimum value compatible with the second-order and stability conditions being
met, i.e.,  = 16:119 . We then observe how (20a) and (20b) vary with s and . In
Figure 4 below, panels (a) and (b) illustrate the contour plot (20a) and (20b) of
respectively. The white region indicates irrelevant combinations of (s,), i.e.,
those that do not lead to an interior solution ( s  2 ). The dark grey region in
panel (a) shows the combination of s and  that give 2nxvs   sxvn < 0; while
the light grey region indicates the opposite. In panel (b) the light grey region
shows that sxvn   nx
v
s
2 > 0 for all admissible values of s and : It is then the
case that both 2nxvs   sxvn > 0 and sxvn   nx
v
s
2 > 0 hold in the light grey
17 In the special case of  = 1; i.e., rms are symmetric, any degree of voluntary information
sharing is always optimal as x
v
s
2
< xvn < 2x
v
s holds for all x
v
n = x
v
s = x
v , as obtained by Kultti
and Takalo (1998).
18To satisfy the relevant second order and stability conditions it is necessary to impose the
restriction that  > 16
9
:
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region of panel (a); this is the area showing combinations of s and  that result
in information exchange. The following Claim summarises this discussion.
(a): 2nxvs   sxvn (b): sxvn   nx
v
s
2
Figure 4.  = 16:1=9; n = 1
Claim 2 Given  = 16:1=9; n = 1; s > 2 ; the South rm always nds
information exchange benecial for all possible values of  and s: On the con-
trary, only for s su¢ cient high does the North rm nd information exchange
benecial for all possible values of :
Next, we explore how the region where both rms engage in information
exchange changes as R&D becomes more di¢ cult, i.e., we change the values
of the paramter . Figure 5 illustrates for selected values of , ranging from
very easy R&D (low value) to di¢ cult R&D (high value). The dark gray area
diminishes as  increases: as R&D becomes more di¢ cult/costly, the area where
both rms engage in information exchange increases, this is so for even low s.
As the North rm faces an inferior South rm competitor, it compares the gain
from sharing information with the gain from forgoing the sharing agreement,
when making its R&D decision. When R&D is not relatively costly, and the
South rm is not very productive in R&D, the North nds that it does better
not sharing information in a wide range of cases (combinations of s and ) ;
as R&D becomes more costly the gain from exchanging information even with
a low R&D productivity rival outweighs the loss of not pursuing information
exchange and sharing information is generally better for both rms.
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(a)  = 16:1=9 (b)  = 2:5
(c)  = 3:5 (d)  = 10
Figure 5. Areas where (20a) and (20b) hold ( n = 1)
In summary then, even when IPR are strictly protected, the R&D invest-
ments made by the North and the South rms are su¢ cient to induce informa-
tion exchange.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the impact of di¤erent regimes of IPR protection on
the performance of asymmetric duopolists in a North-South context where the
South rm has a capability to perform process R&D but at a lower produc-
tivity compared to the North rm. Our analysis allows to examine how rms
investment incentives and their prots di¤er across two contrasting IPR protec-
tion regimes, and also how the rmsR&D decisions are a¤ected by the level
of the South rms R&D productivity. These results could shed some light on
the governmentspolicy on the pursuit or not of enforcing strict IPR protection
regimes.
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The major nding that gives our model novelty is that the North rm earns
higher prot when the South country does not protect the North rms IPR
compared to what it would obtain had the IPR protection been strictly enforced,
provided that the South rms R&D productivity is not too low. Also, the South
rm prefers strict IPR protection regime if its R&D productivity is too low to
make adequate use of spillovers from the North under weak IPR protection. By
allowing for the possibility of process innovation by the rm in the South, our
results contrast with those derived by Chin and Grossman (1990), Diwan and
Rodrik (1991), Deardor¤ (1992) and µZigi´c (1998), where a conict of interests
with respect to IPRs between North and South is the norm. In our model , a
consensus on the IPR protection regime can be reached when the South rms
R&D productivity is relatively high but the conict between North and South
seems to be inevitable if the South rms R&D productivity is not high enough.
We also nd that in the case where conicts are inevitable, the option of
side payments can be used to induce rms to agree upon a particular regime
of IPR protection. Unless the R&D is very cheap to deliver industry prot is
higher when IPR are not protected. The benet from making savings on the
rms own R&D expense via free-riding on other rms R&D is signicant. The
North rm nds side payment o¤ered by the South in exchange for the Norths
adoption of no IPR protection regime benecial.
In addition, we investigate the case where IPR protection is strictly enforced
and rms are allowed to voluntarily engage in information exchange. With a
uniform degree of sharing set for both sides, any degree of information sharing
is benecial as long as what the North rm can get in terms of knowledge
spillovers from the South rm is greater than a half of what the South rm can
benet from the North rms R&D and what the South rm obtains in terms
of productive R&D is larger than a half of what it gives to the North rm, even
for low values of the South rms R&D productivity.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Since both FPs ; 
NP
s increase with ; they attain their minima at  =
1
2 ; and
reach their maxima at  = 1:We show that the minimum of NPs is higher than
the maximum of FPs ; by evaluating 
FP
s at  = 1 (for its maximum) and 
NP
s
at  = 1=2 (for its minimum). From NPs j=1=2 = K
2
9 and 
FP
s j=1 = K
2(9 8)
(9 4)2 ;
we have NPs j=1=2  FPs j=1 = 16K
2
9(9 4)2 > 0: Thus for  >
12
9 and  2
 
1
2 ; 1

;
FPs < 
NP
s : From
d FPn
d < 0 and
dNPn
d > 0 for  2 ( 12 ; 1]; it is implied that
NPn reaches its maximum at  = 1 and its minimum at  =
1
2 ; whereas 
FP
n
reaches its maximum at  = 12 and its minimum at  = 1: Next, we examine if
there is any  such that FPn < 
NP
n ; in doing so we evaluate 
NP
n and 
FP
n at
their maxima and minima.
At  = 12 ; 
FP
n j=1=2 = 9K
2(3 1)2(9 8)
[(9 8)(9 2) 4]2 and 
NP
n j=1=2 = 2K
2
9(2 1) ; so
FPn j=1=2   NPn j=1=2 = 9K
2(40+3(3(27 8) 59))
9((9 8)(9 2) 4)2(2 1) > 0. However, as  >
12
9
(from the stability condition), the denominator of this expression is positive.
The term 3(27   8)   59 reaches its minimum of 2:53 at  = 129 : Therefore
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FPn j=1=2 > NPn j=1=2 : At  = 1; FPn j=1 = K
2(9 8)
(9 4)2 and 
NP
n j=1 =
K2(9 2)
(9 4)2 ; so 
FP
n j=1 NPn j=1 =  6K
2
(9 4)2 < 0; therefore 
FP
n j=1 < NPn j=1:
Thus, with d 
FP
n
d < 0 and
dNPn
d > 0 the sign of ( 
FP
n   NPn ) changes
from positive to negative as we move from  = 1=2 to  = 1: This implies that
FPn and 
NP
n intersect once within  2
 
1
2 ; 1

: In other words, for  > 129 and
 2 ( 12 ; 1); there exists a critical value of ; e such that for  > e; FPn < NPn ;
and FPn > 
NP
n otherwise.
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